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Recent Treaties and Statutes
DRUG CONTROL-PROTOCOL

AMENDING THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON

NARCOTIC DRUGS,

1961-PROTOCOL STRENGTHENS THE AUTHORITY
OF THE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD

The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961,1 constituted a
major step toward international acceptance of responsibility 2 for the
control of licit and illicit drug traffic. The Single Convention
achieved a unified codification4 of existing multilateral treaties in the
field' and created the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB),

1. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, opened for signature March
30, 1961, [1967] 2 U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S. No. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 204 (effective
for the United States December 13, 1964) [hereinafter cited as Single Convention].
2. "The obligations which derive from the existence of the contemporary
situation of drug dependence are twofold: effective national controls and
international cooperation to maximize national efforts." Bassiouni, The InternationalNarcotics Control System: A Proposal,46 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 713,716
(1972).
3. The 1970 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board stated:
"Any assessment of the present degree of drug abuse throughout the world must
conclude that the gravity of the situation has deepened during the year. Misuse of
narcotic and other dangerous substances has escalated sharply in a number of
countries and the outlook is profoundly disquieting." U.N. Doc. E/INCB/9
(1970).
4. Single Convention, art. 44.
5. A chronological list of major international efforts to control narcotics
begins with The Hague Convention of 1912. The Convention enunciated several
general principles, including the control of production and distribution of raw
opium, which have remained the foundation of subsequent drug control efforts.
The absence of administrative machinery, however, weakened The Hague
Convention considerably. International Opium Convention, Jan. 23, 1912, 38
Stat. 1912 (1915), T.S. No. 612, 8 L.N.T.S. 187.
The Geneva Convention of 1925 attempted to provide the necessary
administrative machinery missing from The Hague Convention of 1912. The
Geneva Convention of 1925 required governments to furnish to a Permanent
Central Opinion Board annual statistics concerning the production of opium, the
manufacture, consumption and stocks of narcotic drugs, and quarterly reports on
imports and exports. Significantly, the Board was authorized to recommend an
embargo on the export of drugs to any country that threatened to become a
Spring, 1973

center of illicit traffic. International Opium Convention, Feb. 19, 1925, 81
L.N.T.S. 317.
In an effort to carry out the principle of limiting the use of narcotic drugs to
medical and scientific purposes, the Narcotics Convention of 1931 required
noncontracting parties as well as parties to the Convention to furnish annual
advance estimates of narcotics needed for these purposes. These estimates were
examined by an international body of experts, the Drug Supervisory Body, which
was authorized to establish estimates for countries failing to furnish them.
Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of
Narcotic Drugs, July 13, 1931, 48 Stat. 1543 (1933), T.S. No. 863, 139 L.N.T.S.
301.
After World War II the United Nations assumed the initiative in the drug
control field. The Paris Protocol of 1948, which supplements the Narcotics
Convention of 1931, was designed to close the gaps in the existing control system
created by discoveries in the field of synthetic drugs. The Paris Protocol required
the parties to inform the Secretary General of any drug capable of producing
addiction that was not covered by a previous treaty. If the World Health
Organization (WHO) determined that the drug was addictive, the drug then
became subject to appropriate control under the Narcotics Convention of 1931.
Protocol Bringing Under International Control Drugs Outside the Scope of the
Convention of 13 July 1931 for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the
Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, as Amended by the Protocol Signed at Lake
Success on 11 December 1946, Nov. 19, 1948, [1951] 2 U.S.T. 1629, T.I.A.S.
No. 2308, 44 U.N.T.S. 277.
There still remained the problem of actually limiting the production of raw
opium to medical and scientific purposes. A plan for the reorganization of the
opium trade into an international monopoly was proposed, but the principal
opium-producing and drug-manufacturing countries could not agree on three key
points: the price of opium, an effective means of international inspection and a
method of financing the monopoly. A compromise resulted in the Opium
Protocol of 1953, which limited production and use of opium to medical and
scientific needs. Production for export was limited to seven countries, and the
parties agreed not to permit the import of opium from any state not a party to
the Protocol. The Protocol did not become effective until 1963, and has had
limited effect because three of the seven exporting countries are not parties.
Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the
Production of, International and Wholesale Trade in, and Use of Opium, opened
for signature June 23, 1953, [1963] 1 U.S.T. 10, T.I.A.S. No. 5273, 456 U.N.T.S.
56. See Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 722-28; Bevans, InternationalConventions in
the Field of NarcoticDrugs, 37 TEMP. L.Q. 41, 42-53 (1963).
6. The requirement in article 4 of the Single Convention that the parties take
all necessary steps to limit the production to medical and scientific purposes is the
most forthright statement in fifty years of drug legislation. Waddell, International
NarcoticsControl, 64 Am. J. INT'L L. 310, 316 (1970).
The drug problem is difficult to control at the production end, however, since
a very small plot of the poppy plant can supply a large number of users. For
example, it has been estimated that one or two per cent of the land that is
commonly being used to grow poppies can supply the entire United States
Vol. 6-No. 2
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granting that body the greatest control over the production 6 of drugsv
ever given to an international body. The Single Convention, however,
had several obvious weaknesses. 8 Implementation depended on state
cooperation and the willingness of the parties to enact domestic
enforcement procedures." The Single Convention contained no firm
international commitments to limit the production of opium; 10
decisions concerning opium production were left to the individual
parties subject only to general guidelines against overproduction. The
Single Convention limited the authority of the INCB primarily to
making recommendations and requests." In addition, information on
which the INCB could act under the Single Convention was restricted

market. See Hearings on Executive J Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 Hearings].
Thus control over the production of drugs is not as significant as it may seem.
7. One obvious omission from the Single Convention is the failure to include
psychotropic substances. The Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971, was
enacted to fill this gap in drug legislation. E/Conf. 58/6 (1971). For a discussion
of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances and a comparison with the Single
Convention see Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 740-48.
8. See Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 731.
9. For instance, the controls on production are largely indirect; there are no
provisions for the assignment of quotas or ceilings on production. Instead, the
parties agree to take measures to insure compliance with the treaty, "[h] aving due
regard to their constitutional, legal and administrative systems." Single Con.
vention, art. 35. See also Single Convention, art. 36.
The INCB has limited authority under the Single Convention to request
information and explanations, make public declarations that a party has violated
its obligations, and, under article 14(2), make a recommendation to parties that
they impose embargoes on imports and exports against an offending country. See
note 11 infra.
10. Article 4(1)(c) merely provided that the "[p]arties shall take such
legislative and administrative measures as may be necessary" to limit the
production of drugs to medical and scientific purposes. Single Convention, art.
4(1)(c) (emphasis added).
11. For instance, the INCB could only recommend an embargo to the other
parties (art. 14(2)); it could make requests for additional information and an
explanation if it had reason to believe that the aims of the Single Convention were
being endangered seriously by reason of the failure of any country or territory to
carry out the provisions of the Single Convention (art. 14(1)(a)); and it could
request that parties wishing to begin production of more than five tons of opium
not do so (art. 24(2)(a)(ii)). See, e.g., Hearings on International Aspects of the
Narcotics Problem Before the Subcomm. on Europe of the House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971
Hearings].
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almost completely to that received from governmental sources. 2 Due
to reporting delays, any overproduction' 3 was often in the stream of
illicit traffic before the INCB could act. Finally, escape clauses
weakened international sanctions applicable to individual offenders;
each party could use its own law to punish an offender and could
refuse extradition if the party determined that the offense was not
"sufficiently serious."' 4 In an effort to remedy these weaknesses, the
United States in March of 1971's proposed' 6 several amendments' 7
to the Single Convention,'" most of which related to strengthening
the authority of the INCB.' 9 Under the proposed amendments the
INCB was to be given the authority to make direct inquiries of any party
about the cultivation and production of opium inside its borders. The
INCB could act on the basis of all information it received, regardless
of origin, and also would have the authority to conduct local

12. See, e.g., Single Convention, art. 14(1)(a).
13. Article 20 required the parties to furnish statistical returns on production
or manufacture, utilization, consumption, imports and exports, seizures and
stocks of drugs. Except for returns concerning imports and exports, which were to
be prepared quarterly, these returns were prepared only annually, however, and
could be furnished to the INCB as late as six months following the year to which
they related. Single Convention, art. 20(2)(a).
14. Article 36 provides that "the Party shall have the right to refuse to grant
the extradition in cases where the competent authorities consider that the offence
is not sufficiently serious." Single Convention, art. 36(b)(iv). This provision was
not changed by the recent amendments. See note 29 infra and accompanying text.
15. Letter from George Bush, Permanent Representative of the United States
to the United Nations, to the Secretary General, Mar. 18, 1971, in U.N. Doc.
E/4971(L) (1971).
16. Article 47 provides that any party may propose an amendment to the
Convention, and establishes a process through which amendments pass for
consideration. Single Convention, art. 47.
17. The two main objectives of these amendments were to establish controls
adequate to insure compliance with limitations on production and manufacture,
and to provide, adequate inducements and assistance to parties so that they could
comply effectively with their treaty obligations. See Bassiouni, supra note 2, at
733; Hearings on S.509, S.694, S.1188, S.1944, S...
Res. 78 and S. Con. Res. 8
Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 106 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as July 1, 1971 Hearings].

18. For a statement of the objectives of these proposed amendments by
Harvey R. Wellman, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Narcotic
Matters, see 1971 Hearings, supra note 11, at 106.

19. The United States also proposed that the membership of the INCB be
increased from eleven to thirteen persons so that better geographic representation
could be achieved. This amendment was accepted.
Vol. 6-No. 2
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investigation2" of suspected drug-related activities. In addition to the
estimates of consumption required by the Single Convention, 2 ' each
party would be required to submit an annual estimate of its opium
production and could not produce in excess of its estimate. Under the
United States proposal, the INCB also would have the authority to
impose an embargo on the import and export of narcotic drugs by any
country or territory determined to be in danger of becoming a center
of illicit traffic. Finally, the INCB could recommend to United
Nations authorities that financial and technical assistance be provided
for a state attempting to fulfill its obligations under the Single
Convention. A plenipotentiary conference was convened in March
1972 to consider the amendments and most were accepted without
change. In final form the amendments strengthen both the authority
and enforcement powers of the INCB and the machinery for the
extradition of drug offenders. The amendments also encourage the
parties to provide general rehabilitative measures for drug abusers in
lieu of punishment, make provisions for technical and financial
assistance to the parties and permit the INCB to utilize additional
sources of information. Protocol Amending the Single Convention on
NarcoticDrugs, 1961, Executive J, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).22
Pursuant to the accepted amendments, the INCB will endeavor to
limit cultivation, production, manufacture and use of drugs to medical
and scientific requirements.23 If the INCB finds that a party has not
limited its opium production in accordance with its estimate,24 the
INCB may deduct all, or a portion, of the overproduction from that
party's allotted production for the next year.2" The Protocol expands

20. Combined with the greater permitted number of sources of information,
this amendment would help alleviate the delay problem so that the INCB could
begin action immediately. It would also increase the effectiveness of the INCB's
enforcement authority.
21. Single Convention, art. 19(1)(a).
22. Executive J, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REc. 14, 853 (daily ed.
Sept. 14, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Protocol].
23. Protocol, art. 2(4). Note that originally this was a general obligation of
the parties, and has now been made a function of the INCB as well. See note 10
supra.

24. Under the Single Convention the parties are required to submit estimates
of the amount of drugs to be consumed for medical and scientific purposes. Single
Convention, art. 19(1)(a). The amendments provide that each party also must
submit an estimate of the approximate amount of opium it will produce, and the
party is obligated not to exceed this estimate. Protocol, arts. 9(1)(f), (5).
25. Protocol, art. 11(2). Unfortunately, the problem enunciated by the
United States (see note 20 supra and accompanying text) that the delay in
Spring, 1973
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the sources of information on which the INCB may act to include
United Nations organs and specialized agencies, and certain intergovernmental and international nongovernmental organizations.2 6
The INCB does not have the right of local investigation, 27 however,
nor is there a mandatory embargo provision 28 as the United States
had proposed. Although certain exceptions are allowed,2 9 article
14(2) of the Protocol strengthens the extradition provisions of the
Single Convention 0 and thus makes unnecessary the amendment of
bilateral extradition treaties that do not cover narcotics offenses. 1
Finally, article 14(1)(b) of the Protocol states that the parties may
require, either as alternatives to punishment or in addition to
punishment, that drug abusers undergo programs of treatment,
education, rehabilitation and social reintegration 32 in conformity
exercising control by the INCB weakens the INCB's power to control illicit traffic
is not solved. The only restraints on overproduction within any one-year period
are expressed in general terms. See, e.g., Protocol, art. 11(1).
26. These international nongovernmental organizations must have "direct
competence in the subject matter." Protocol, art. 6(l)(a).
27. If, on the basis of information received from the expanded sources of
information, the INCB has objective reasons to believe that the aims of the
Convention are being endangered seriously by reason of the failure of any party to
carry out provisions of the Single Convention, it may propose to the government
concerned that a study of the matter be carried out in its territory by such means
as the government deems appropriate. Protocol, art. 6(1)(c).
28. The recommendatory nature of the embargo provision of the Single
Convention remains unchanged. Single Convention, art. 14(2). See note 11 supra
and accompanying text. The State Department has indicated, however, that little
was lost in the defeat of these two proposals. 1972 Hearings,supra note 6, at 51.
29. The party may still refuse extradition if the competent authorities
consider that the offense is not "sufficiently serious." Protocol, art. 14(2)(b)(iv).
30. Under the terms of the Protocol, "cultivation, production, manufacture,
extraction, preparation, possession, offering, offering for sale, distribution,
purchase, sale, delivery,... brokerage, dispatch in transit, transport, importation
and exportation of drugs, [and] [i] nternational participation in, conspiracy to
commit and attempts to commit, any of such offenses, and preparatory acts and
finandial operations in connexion with" such offenses shall be "deemed to be
included as an extraditable offence in any extradition treaty existing between
Parties." Protocol, arts. 14(l)(a), 14(2)(a)(ii).
The parties may consider the Single Convention as the legal basis for
extradition if no extradition treaty exists between them. Protocol, art.
14(2)Co)(ii).

31. 1972 Hearings, supra note 6, at 46.

32. The Single Convention encouraged parties to punish violators of the
Convention with "imprisonment or other penalties of deprivation of liberty."
Single Convention, art. 36(1).
Vol. 6-No. 2
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with article 15(1) of the Protocol.
The amendments strengthen the authority of the INCB and provide
international uniformity in the treatment of drug traffickers and drug
abusers. Such international standards promote effective control of
worldwide licit and illicit drug traffic primarily by providing a
common foundation on which parties can build detailed bilateral
agreements. The Single Convention and the Protocol retain a number
of weaknesses. The amendments continue the approach developed in
earlier treaties by placing on national governments' the principal
responsibility for controlling narcotics. The INCB can recommend
that an embargo be imposed against an offending party,3" but the
actual decision to impose an embargo is made by national governments. In most instances national governments, relying on the
"sufficiently serious offense" clause, 6 may deny extradition of
offenders. Furthermore, because of the inherent delay in the
enforcement scheme, 3" actual implementation of the INCB's enforcement duties under the Single Convention still depends primarily on
the cooperation of the parties. Cooperation and decision making in
turn depend on the internal conditions3" of the country, which often
make it difficult for the country to carry out its obligations under the
Single Convention. These flaws, characteristic of multilateral agreements, 39 are largely a result of compromises made at the conference

33. Articles 15 and 16 place an affirmative duty on the parties to take
measures for the prevention of drug abuse and the "early identification,
treatment, education, after-care, rehabilitation and social reintegration" of drug
abusers. Protocol, arts. 15, 16.
34. "The Amending Protocol continues to rely on the indirect scheme of
control depending too significantly on governmental cooperation without direct
enforcement sanction or even independent fact-finding machinery." Bassiouni,
supra note 2, at 749. See Waddell, supra note 6, at 321.
35. See notes 11 & 30 supra and accompanying text.
36. See notes 14 & 29 supra and accompanying text.
37. See notes 20 & 25 supra and accompanying text.
38. These problems are either political, economic, social or some combination thereof. For instance, the recent decision of the Turkish Government to ban
the cultivation of opium poppies involved all three. It was a difficult decision both
economically and socially since the primary growers of the poppy in Turkey are
low income farmers who have been growing the poppy legally for hundreds of
years. These factors made the ultimate decision politically hazardous. See
generally W. SPONG, HEROIN: CAN THE SUPPLY BE STOPPED?, Report to
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as 1972 Report].
39. See Goodrich, New Trends in Narcotics Control, 1960 INT'L CONCILIATION

181, 190-91 (No. 530).
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stage, and represent both important issues of national sovereignty 4
and differing opinions of the severity of the drug problem. The Single
Convention and Protocol, however, may lay the foundation for
bilateral agreements, which generally are less susceptible to weakening
compromise. A bilateral agreement is more likely to provide detailed

provisions for enforcement, since a country may be more willing to
restrict its sovereignty in relation to one country than to grant

concessions to a large number of countries with differing political
orientations. Furthermore, bilateral agreements are strengthened by
factors peculiar to the two nations involved. For example, Turkey
recently announced that it would forbid all opium poppy planting by
June 1973.41 This law is the result of persistent negotiations between
the United States and Turkey, the threat by the United States to
withhold aid from Turkey, 4' and the United States promise to

One characteristic weakness of many multilateral treaties that has not plagued
the Single Convention is the problem of reservations. See generally W. BISHOP,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 132 (1971). The Single Convention specifically established to which articles parties could make reservations, and what kind of
reservations. Single Convention, arts. 49, 50.
40. See generally W. STANKIEWICZ, IN DEFENSE OF SOVEREIGNTY
127 (1969).
41. Turkish Opium Decree, June 30, 1971, in July 1, 1971 Hearings,supra
note 17, at 74. See also Statement by Prime Minister Erim of Turkey, June 30,
1971, id. at 72-74; 1972 Report, supra note 38, at 16-17.
42. "It is the sense of the Congress that effective international cooperation is
necessary to put an end to the illicit production, smuggling, trafficking in, and
abuse of dangerous drugs.... [T]he President is authorized to conclude
agreements with other countries to facilitate control of the production,
processing, transportation, and distribution of ... narcotic drugs .... Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President is autiorized to furnish
assistance to any country or international organization ... for the control of the
production of, processing of, smuggling of, and traffic in, narcotic and
psychotropic drugs. The President shall suspend economic and military assistance
furnished under this chapter or any other Act... with respect to any country
when the President determines that the government of such country has failed to
take adequate steps to prevent narcotic drugs ... produced or processed ... in
such country, or transported through such country ... from entering the United
States unlawfully. Such suspension shall continue until the President determines
that the government of such country has taken adequate steps to carry out the
purpose of this part." Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972, § 503, 22
U.S.C.A. § 2291 (Supp., 1973),formerly pt. I, ch. 4, § 401, 75 Stat. 434 (1961).
Cutting off foreign aid, however, often will not be the best method for
obtaining the cooperation of the country. Such action may create internal
political pressures that will make it difficult for the country to take the desired

Vol. 6-No. 2
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increase aid and give technological assistance for crop substitution.4 3
Although multilateral treaties such as the Single Convention and the
Protocol are essential in providing a framework for international
acceptance of responsibility for control of the drug problem, bilateral
agreements must continue to provide the primary vehicle for effective
international drug control.
Donald C. Van Pelt, Jr.

action. Statement by Harvey Wellman, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
for Narcotics Matters, in July 1, 1971 Hearings,supra note 17, at 103.
43. A further problem for the United States now is whether such threats and
promises will be necessary in other poppy-growing countries such as Burma,
Thailand and Laos to keep them from filling the void left by Turkey's ban. See
N.Y. Times, July 1, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
An additional reason for cooperation may come from within the country
itself; a major factor in the recent French cooperation in breaking up illicit
processing plants in the Marseilles area was the French realization that she also
had a heroin-addiction problem. N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1970, at 1, col. 1. See also
July 1, 1971 Hearings,supra note 17, at 32.
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JURISDICTION-THE EEC
AND

ENFORCEMENT

CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION

OF JUDGMENTS-EFFECTS

OF COURTS

ON BRITISH COMMON

LAW PRINCIPLES

Economic integration and expanded trade have led to increased
legal contacts among the nationals of Common Market Member
States.' This increase in economic activity necessitated the establishment of rules to govern the relationship among the courts of Member
States.2 Historically, bilateral agreements between Member States
established the bases for recognition and enforcement of judgments
rendered in foreign courts? The lack of unanimity among these
bilateral agreements,' however, required the formulation of a multilateral Common Market agreement. The resulting Convention, which
became effective on January 1, 1973, s establishes common bases of
jurisdiction and simplifies domestic procedures for the recognition of
foreign judgments. 6 The new procedures have effected significant
changes in the individual Member States, especially in Great Britain.
The Convention bases the general competence of courts on the
domicile of the defendant and guarantees recognition of the judicial
decisions of any Member State in all other Member States without
additional proceedings. Convention on Jurisdiction of Courts and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2 CCH
COMM. MKT. REP.
6003 (1968) (unofficial English text).
1. E.g., [1965-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH COMM. MET. REP., NEW
DEVELOPMENTS
9243 at 8509 (1968). The Member States, as of January 1,
1973, are: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Great Britain, Ireland and the Netherlands
officially became members on January 1, 1973.
2. "It is an obstacle to close economic relations if the enforcement of private
legal claims is unduly complicated, time consuming and expensive. It is the more
so if trade relations take the form of an instituted regional arrangement: 'A true
common market presupposes that each national of a member state enjoys the
same protection of his person and rights in the territory of another member state
as the latter's own nationals.'" Hay, The Common Market Preliminary Draft
Convention of the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments-Some Considerations of Policy and Interpretation,16 AM. J. CoMP. L. 149 (1968).
3. Id. at 171.
4. For a discussion of the lack of unanimity see Hay, supra note 2.
5. The Convention was signed by the original six Common Market Member
States on September 27, 1968. The three new members, Denmark, Great Britain
and Ireland, adopted the Convention when they signed the Accession Treaty for
Membership.
6. The purposes of the Convention are found in its preamble. The unofficial
English text is found in 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
6003 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Convention]; Hay, supra note 2, at 171-72.
Vol. 6-No. 2
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Member States were unable to achieve multilateral recognition of
their judgments within the Common Market prior to the Convention.!
In 1959, pursuant to article 2208 of the European Economic
Community Treaty,9 representatives and experts of the original
Member States began negotiations that led, in 1964, to a draft
convention on the recognition and enforcement of judgments. This
draft eliminated the use of certain exorbitant jurisdictional bases l0

7. Since many courts were distrustful of the capability of courts of another
state, there was a belief that the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments could be established only through treaties between countries that had
confidence in each other's courts. Early history showed very little progress in
multilateral recognition of foreign judgments. For example, Dutch efforts in 1874
and, particularly, Italian efforts in 1881 to formulate an international convention
had no practical results. Lorenzen, The Enforcement of American Judgments
Abroad, 29 YALE L.J. 188, 189 (1920). Recent developments demonstrate the
Member States' distrust of foreign courts. At the 1968 Hague Conference on
Private International Law, the original Member States demanded regional, rather
than international, agreements concerning judgments rendered in foreign countries. Nadelmann, The Common Market Judgments Convention and a Hague
Conference Recommendation: What Steps Next?, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1282, 1283
(1969).
8. 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
5251 (1967). Article 220 sets forth certain
subjects on which Member States may negotiate to insure uniform, legal
guarantees to all nationals. It provides in part: "Member States shall, in so far as
necessary, enter into negotiations with each other with a view to ensuring for the
benefit of their nationals... the simplification of the formalities governing the
reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments of the ordinary courts of
law (d~cisionsjudiciaires)and arbitral awards."
9. The European Economic Community Treaty was signed by the original
Member States in Rome on March 25, 1957. It became effective on January 1,
1958. 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 151 (1973).
10. Exorbitant bases of jurisdiction are created to allow courts to assume
jurisdiction by virtue of the nationality of one of the parties or of some other
nationalistic criterion. Examples are the domicile of the plaintiff or presence of
the defendant's assets within the jurisdiction. 1 A. CAMPBELL, COMMON
MARKET LAW § 9-4 (Supp. No. 3 1972). Exorbitant jurisdiction is treated in
Convention $ 6007. Although
6007 prohibits the use of the following
exorbitant jurisdiction provisions against domiciliaries of Member States, the
provisions may be exerted against domiciliaries of foreign countries: Belgium,
article 15 of the Civil Code and articles 52 and 53 of the Law of March 25, 1876,
Concerning Jurisdiction; the Federal Republic of Germany, section 23 of the
Code of Civil Procedure; France, articles 14 and 15 of the Civil Code; Italy,
articles 2, 4(1) and 4(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure; Luxembourg, articles
14 and 15 of the Civil Code; and the Netherlands, articles 126(3) and 127 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
Spring, 1973
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against the domiciliaries of Member States, e.g., the assertion of
jurisdiction solely on the basis of the plaintiff's nationality, regardless
of the defendant's nationality or the situs of the transaction that gave
rise to the cause of action.1 1 The Extraordinary Session of the Hague
Conference, which met at The Hague in 1966, advocated the complete
abolition of exorbitant bases of jurisdiction. In response to this
pressure, the final draft, concluded in 1968, permits Member States
and foreign countries to enter agreements to refuse recognition and
enforcement of judgments based on exorbitant jurisdiction. 2 The
specific provisions of the Convention can be grouped under two major
headings-the jurisdiction of courts, and the recognition and enforcement of judgments. First, a Member State court has jurisdiction over
any civil or commercial action brought against a natural or legal
person domiciled in that state13 -irrespective of nationality. This
general rule is limited by special situations in which a defendant may
14
be sued in a Member State other than his state of domicile.
Additional provisions state that the courts of a Member State have
exclusive jurisdiction over matters concerning real property, corporations, public records, patents and trademarks and enforcement of
judgments, regardless of domicile." The Convention also permits,
within very narrow guidelines, the formulation of agreements on
jurisdiction between contracting parties.16 Under the second major
heading of the Convention-the recognition and enforcement of

11. Nadelmann, supra note 7.
12. Convention 4 6063. For an exhaustive analysis of article 59 of the
Convention and its relationship to judgments rendered in jurisdictionally improper
forums see Nadelmann, supra note 7.
13. Domicile of a party is determined under domestic law of the state where
the action is brought. Convention $ 6056.
14. For example, a defendant may be sued on a contract in the courts of the
state in which the contract was to be performed. If a claim is based on a tort
injury, defendant may be sued in courts of the state in which the injury was
sustained. A claim based on the operation of a branch office, agency or other
establishment may be maintained in the courts of the state where the facility is
located. Convention 6009. In addition, an action may be maintained in courts
other than those of the defendant's domicile if there are codefendants and one
defendant is sued in the court of his domicile, or if there are suits pending in
different states that may be consolidated. Convention 4 6010(1), 6025-26.
15. Convention 6020.
16. Convention
6016, 6019. An agreement may derogate from the
Convention if: (1) the agreement was entered after the dispute arose; (2) the
agreement permits the parties to bring suit in additional courts not specified by
the Convention; or (3)the agreement is not prohibited by state law.
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judgments-the general rule is that decisions1 7 rendered by courts of
one Member State are to be recognized by other Member States
without additional proceedings 8 or review of the legality of the
decision. 9 Member States, however, will not enforce decisions if the
defendant was not properly served with process, if recognition is
against the public policy of the Member State or contravenes
provisions of private international law, or if the decision conflicts with
a previous decision concerning the same parties rendered by the
enforcing court. 2 Decisions rendered in courts of Member States
generally are enforced in other Member States after a writ of
execution has been issued. 2 ' The Convention lists the courts in each
Member State to which a request for a writ of execution must be
delivered,22 as well as those courts in which appeals concerning
issuance of the writ must be filed2" and the courts that will hear those
appeals.2 4 Although the terms and conditions of the request for the
writ are governed by the law of the state in which enforcement is
sought,2" the Convention requires specific documents for enforcement of a foreign decision.2 6 In civil and commercial matters, the
Convention supersedes certain bilateral treaties regarding mutual
recognition of foreign judgments.21
Great Britain's entry into the Common Market and resulting adherence to this Convention2" has affected British principles concerning
the jurisdiction of its courts and the courts of Member States. 29 First,
17. Under the terms of the Convention, "decision" means "any decision
rendered by a court of a Contracting State regardless of its designation, such as
decree, judgment, order, or writ of execution, as well as a determination of the
court costs by the clerk of the court." Convention $ 6029.
18. Convention 6030.
19. Convention 6033.
20. Convention 6031.
6035, 6055.
21. Convention
22. Convention 6036.
23. Convention 6041.
24. Convention 6045.
25. Convention 6037.
6050-53.
26. Convention
27. Convention 6059.
28. For discussions of the Accession Treaty and the legal problems it will
cause for Great Britain, see Bowyer, EnglishingCommunity Law, 9 COMM. MKT.
L.R. 439 (1972); Mitchell, Kuipers & Gall, ConstitutionalAspects of the Treaty
and Legislation Relating to English Membership, 9 COMM. MKT. L.R. 134
(1972); 9 COMM. MKT. L.R. 94 (1972).

29. It is extremely important to note that the Convention binds British law
only if a judgment rendered in a Member State is sought to be enforced in Britain,
Spring, 1973

RECENT TREATIES AND STATUTES

since British jurisdiction actually is acquired by personal service on the
defendant,3" domicile never had been recognized in Great Britain as a
basis for jurisdiction.3 1 Under the Convention, however, Great Britain
must recognize the domicile of the defendant as the basis for
jurisdiction in its own courts and in the courts of Member States.32
Thus the Convention eliminates some traditional bases of jurisdiction
exerted by British courts over a defendant.3 3 On the other hand, the
Convention grants British courts additional jurisdiction over a defendant when he is not served with process within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court.34 For example, a British court now has
competence to hear an action brought against a nondomiciliary

or a judgment rendered in Britain is sought to be enforced in a Member State.
Convention
6064. The Convention does not affect British common law
principles governing judgments rendered in foreign countries and sought to be
enforced in Great Britain.
30. Castel, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Personam
and in Rem in the Common Law Provinces of Canada, 17 McGILL L.J. 11, 33
(1971). E.g., Singh v. Rajah of Faridkote, [1894] A.C. 670, 684. See also
Emanuel v. Symon, [1908] 1 K.B. 302.
31. H. READ, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS 160 (1938); 1 THE SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 1 11/1 (3d ed.
1973) [hereinafter cited as PRACTICE]. It is necessary to note also that the term
domicile does not have a uniform meaning throughout the world. To a civil
lawyer, domicile means habitual residence, but it is the equivalent of a person's
permanent home at common law. G. CHESHIRE & P. NORTH, CHESHIRE'S
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 154 (1970).
32. See note 13 supra.
33. For example, jurisdiction based on service of process on an alien
defendant while he is present in Britain no longer is valid because an action may
be brought only in defendant's domicile. PRACTICE

$

1111/17. Jurisdiction no

longer may be maintained on the basis that a contract in dispute was made in
Britain, or that its breach occurred in Britain. PRACTICE 44 11/1/10-13.
Furthermore, a British court no longer has jurisdiction to issue an injunction or
mandamus against an alien defendant in Britain. PRACTICE

11/1(i). An

indispensable nondomiciliary defendant no longer can be made a party to an
action properly brought against a person served with process in Britain.
PRACTICE 1 11/1(j).

34. An example of the procedural changes in jurisdiction of British courts as a
result of the Convention concerns controversies based on tort claims. Prior to
accession to the Common Market, British courts had jurisdiction over a tort action
if the tort occurred within their jurisdiction. PRACTICE $ 11/1(h). The current
law is that British courts have jurisdiction to determine tort claims if the
defendant is domiciled in Great Britain or if the defendant is a domiciliary of a
Member State and the injury occurred within the jurisdiction of the British court.
Convention $ 6009(3).
Vol. 6-No. 2

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

defendant if a contract was, or is to be, performed in Great Britain, if
the plaintiff is an alimony recipient domiciled in Great Britain, or if
one of several defendants is sued in Great Britain. 35 Secondly, the
Convention has affected British recognition of the exercise of
jurisdiction by Member State courts. Formerly, the British courts
acknowledged the in personam jurisdiction of a foreign court over a
defendant only when the defendant was present in the foreign country
or made a voluntary appearance in the court proceedings. 3 6 The
Convention, however, forbids British courts to question the jurisdiction of the Member States' courts to render any judgment that is
sought to be enforced in Great Britain. 3" The Convention also has
affected British recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered in
Member States. Prior to Britain's entry into the Common Market, all
foreign judgments would be enforced in Great Britain if a domestic
action was brought on the foreign judgment" or if the judgment was
obtained in a foreign country to which the British Foreign Judgments
(Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 193311 had been applied. 4' The
Convention has not altered the operation of these two principles in
relation to foreign judgments rendered outside the Common Market.41 The effect of these principles as they pertain to judgments

35. Convention
6009-10.
36. This practice reflects again the common law principle that jurisdiction is
based on service of process within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. See,
e.g., Societe Cooperative Sidmetal v. Titan Int'l, Ltd., [1966] 2 Q.B. 828.
37. Convention 44 6031-33. Jurisdiction of a foreign court is not listed
among the exceptions that may be alleged to deny recognition of a foreign
judgment in a Member State court.
38. PRACTICE 71/1/2(iv).
39. 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 13, at 143 (1933).
40. PRACTICE 71/1/2(ii). In 1933, the United Kingdom passed legislation
authorizing treaty negotiations and giving Parliament the power to bar recognition

proceedings for judgments from countries denying substantial reciprocity to
judgments from British courts. Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act
1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 13, § 9, at 151-52.

41. For a judgment rendered in a foreign country to be enforced, the
judgment not only must be final and for a specified sum of money, but also must
not contravene public policy. PRACTICE 4 71/1/5. The procedure for
enforcement under the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 is
for the petitioning judgment creditor to make application for enforcement ex
parte to the Practice Master in the Queen's Bench Division. PRACTICE 71/2/1.
On filing of an affidavit, the judgment must be registered. PRACTICE 44 71/3,
71/3/1. The affidavit must support the registration and be exhibited with a
translated, certified copy of the judgment. The affidavit also must state that the
applicant is entitled to the judgment, that it has not been satisfied and that if it
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rendered in Member States in which the court relied on exorbitant
jurisdiction, however, has been modified.4 2 The Convention provides
that a Member State may not exert exorbitant jurisdiction over a
domiciliary of another Member State.4 3 Therefore, a judgment
rendered in a French court under article 14 or 15 of the Civil Code,
exorbitant jurisdiction provisions, against an American domiciled in
Great Britain will not be enforced by British courts on the ground that
the French court lacked jurisdiction. The Convention, however, does
allow Member States to exert certain exorbitant jurisdiction over any
domiciliary of a foreign country. 44 For example, an American
domiciled in the United States but having assets in Great Britain may
be sued in a French court under article 14 or 15 of the Civil Code. If
the French plaintiff petitions for enforcement in Great Britain, the
45
British courts must recognize and enforce the French judgment.
Great Britain, however, may enter an agreement with the United
States to refuse recognition of judgments based on exorbitant
jurisdiction of Member States against domiciliaries of the United
States. 46 By permitting Member States to refuse recognition of
judgments based on exorbitant jurisdiction against domiciliaries of
foreign countries, the Convention has taken a major step toward the
elimination of the use of exorbitant jurisdiction.4 7 New rules recently
have been enacted to amend the Rules of the Supreme Court4" to
conform to the provisions of the Convention according recognition of
judgments not based on exorbitant jurisdiction.4 9 Rule 8 amends
was registered it would not be set aside. The names and addresses of the parties
also are required. Notice of registration must be served on the debtor who must
file a summons supported by an affidavit to contest the registration. PRACTICE
71/8-71/9/2. Absent a challenge to registration or when the challenge is
determined, execution on the judgment will issue. PRACTICE
42. See note 11 supra.
43. Convention 6007.
44. See note 11 supra.
45. See notes 20 & 21 supra and accompanying text.
46. Convention 6063.

71/10-71/13/2.

47. Nadelmann, supra note 7, at 1282.
48. Although the Rules of the Supreme Court pertain to all British courts, the
jurisdiction of the High Court of Justice and of the Court of Appeals will be
affected most by the changes resulting from adherence to the Convention. For a
discussion of the jurisdiction of the High Court of Justice and the Court of
Appeals see CCH 1972 COMM. MKT. MKT. DOING Bus. IN EUR.
24,054,
24,059.
49. STAT. INSTR. 1972, No. 1898 [hereinafter cited as Amendment No.
1898]. The Rules of the Supreme Court became effective on January 1, 1973.
Amendment No. 1898.
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Order 71 of the Supreme Court Rules s ° by prescribing the procedure
for enforcement of European Community judgments. This new
procedure for recognition and enforcement of judgments applies only
to Common Market Member States, but it is similar to the current
procedure, under the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement)
Act 1933, which applies to judgments from all other foreign countries.
Judgment creditors may make ex parte application for registration of
Community judgments to the High Court." An affidavit supporting
the registration application must contain a translation of the judgment
and the enforcement order from the Member State court.5 2 If the
judgment sought to be enforced is for a sum of money, the affidavit
also must state: (1) the name, occupation and last known domicile of
the judgment debtor; (2) that the European Court 3 has not
suspended enforcement of the judgment; and (3) that the judgment
has not been satisfied. 4 On receipt of the application and the
affidavit, the judgment is registered in the Central Recording Office."
When registration is complete, notice of the registered Community
judgment and enforcement order is sent to all persons against whom
the judgment was entered.", Judgment debtors then have 28 days
within which to make application for variation or cancellation of the
registration on the ground that the judgment has been wholly or
partially satisfied.5" An Execution Order on the judgment is issued by
the High Court either 28 days after the date of the registration notice,
or after a determination has been made on any application to vary or
cancel the registration."
New Order 1141' permits the High Court,
PRACTICE $ 71.
51. Amendment No. 1898
8/(4)/17. A judge or a master of the Queen's
Bench Division has the power to rule on the petition. Amendment No. 1898
8/(4)116. The High Court of Justice is the branch of the English Supreme Court of
Judicature that exercises original jurisdiction.
52. Amendment No. 1898 8/(4)/18.
53. The European Court of Justice is the high court of the European
Economic Community; it is responsible for final interpretation of Community
law. See generally 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1 4635, 4656 (1968).
54. Amendment No. 1898
8/(4)/18(2). The sum of money must be
expressed in English currency or a foreign currency calculated at the rate of
exchange on the date the judgment originally was given.
55. Amendment No. 1898 8/(4)/19.
56. Amendment No. 1898 8/(4)/20.
57. Amendment No. 1898 4 8/(4)/20, 22. The 28-day limitation period
generally runs from the date of the notice. The High Court, however, may allow
the period to run from a later date.
58. Amendment No. 1898 8/(4)/21.
59. Amendment No. 1898 11/1.
50.
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the Court of Appeals, or any party to refer questions on the
interpretation or validity of Community law to the European
Court."
The Order for Reference to the European Court may be
made at any point in the proceedings. 1 New Form 109 specifies that
the Order must set out the questions on which the preliminary ruling
of the European Court is sought and that the proceedings in the
British court must be stayed pending the ruling. 62 These changes in
British law concerning enforcement of judgments rendered in Member3
States will not have a substantial effect on British procedure.6
According to British common law, a final judgment of a competent
court will not be recognized or enforced in Great Britain if it was
obtained by fraud, was given contrary to natural justice or would be
contrary to British public policy. 6" These grounds for nonrecognition
of a foreign judgment are essentially those found in paragraphs 6031
and 6032 of the Convention as grounds for denial of recognition and
enforcement. Thus Great Britain may continue to utilize its common
law principles to deny recognition and enforcement of judgments
rendered in Member States as well as in countries outside the
Community.
GeorgeH. CarnallII

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Amendment No. 1898 1112.
Amendment No. 1898 11/1.
Amendment No. 1898 12.
A. CAMPBELL, supra note 10.
PRACTICE
71/9/1& 2.
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